As you've learned in the last few sequences, the central issue in Kant's moral philosophy can be stated as follows: Can morality be construed as fulfilling rational requirements of universality, necessity and objectivity? In other words, does morality have a universal foundation, something common not only to all humans, but to all reasonable beings without exception? Kant's ethics, with which you are now familiar, gave rise to numerous critiques, as you can imagine. There's a famous quote by Charles Péguy about Kantian ethics: "Kantianism has pure hands, but it has no hands" (1910). Although somewhat facetious, this phrase captures the essence and content of the first wave of criticism of Kant's deontological philosophy. The main thrust of the objection is as follows: There are no absolute, universal principles in ethics. Any moral maxim is relative and particular, and depends on the circumstances in which we find ourselves i.e., the circumstances of our actions. Another criticism of Kant's ethics is that it brings nothing to the table in terms of engaging in concrete moral action. It lacks any criteria for defining the conditions of applicability of the categorical imperative in real-life situations. These interrelated objections were at the center of a famous controversy, which opposed Kant's ideas to those of the philosopher Benjamin Constant, as developed in his article "On Political Reactions," published in 1797. Constant's main issue is with the conditions of applicability of the categorical imperative in real-life situations. Are there not, in certain specific situations, conflicts among various duties? In such cases, to which moral principle should we turn to ensure the ethicality of our action? Through his analysis of conflicting duties, Constant elaborates a radical critique of Kantian morality. Specifically, he analyzes cases where two equally valid duties -- from a moral standpoint -- become mutually incompatible, giving rise to a moral impasse. The examples Constant uses to oppose two valid moral duties are the duty to tell the truth (i.e., the prohibition against lying); and the duty to defend a person who is in danger, specifically mortal danger. Let's quote Constant directly: "The moral principle, 'It is a duty to tell the truth,' would make any society impossible if it were taken singly and unconditionally. We have proof of this in the very direct consequences which a German philosopher has drawn from this principle. This philosopher goes so far as to assert that it would be a crime to lie to a murderer who has asked whether our friend who is pursued by him had taken refuge in our house. It is only through intermediary principles that this first principle can be accepted without objections. I'll use the moral principle just stated, that truthfulness is a duty, as an example. On its own, this principle is inapplicable. It would destroy society. Yet rejecting it would also destroy society, since every foundation of morality would be overturned. A means of application must therefore be sought, and, as I've just said, this requires defining the principle. It is a duty to tell the truth. What is duty? The concept of duty is inseparable from the concept of right. A duty is that which in one being corresponds to the rights of another. Where there are no rights, there are no duties. To tell the truth is thus a duty: but it is a duty only in respect to one who has a right to the truth. But no one has a right to a truth which injures others." In this passage, Constant gives a very clear critique of Kantian doctrine. For Constant, there is no <i>a priori</i>, absolute moral principle. The duty to tell the truth, he argues, can neither be applied unconditionally, nor entirely rejected. If I apply it regardless of context, this leads to negative consequences on social life from a moral standpoint -- which is also the case if I unconditionally reject it. Constant's argument, then, focuses on the outcome of our actions, on their moral consequences. To take the duty of truthfulness as a categorical, necessary, universal and apodictic rule is to risk not only making social life impossible, but also contravening the moral law. How so? Let's go back to the text and Constant's direct criticism of Kant (the unnamed "German philosopher"). A murderer asks me if my friend, whom he is pursuing, is hiding in my home. If I respect the moral law, I must tell him the truth. The duty of truthfulness is then a categorical imperative to which I am bound regardless of circumstance. But there is a conflict, says Constant: strict obedience to this duty causes me to violate another moral duty, that of preserving life and assisting those in danger. Thus it is necessary to determine the conditions of applicability of the duty of truthfulness. In what circumstances must I act in the name of truth? For Constant, answering this question requires analysis of the very nature of duty. What is a duty? The notion of duty is inseparable from the notion of right. The notion of right, then, shows us how to resolve the moral conflict opposing the duty to tell the truth on the one hand, and the duty to protect and assist those in danger on the other. The principle that we must tell the truth is not unconditional. Its applicability requires a complementary principle: the idea that duties are inseparable from rights. Hence the resolution of the moral conflict: telling the truth is a duty only to those who have a right to the truth. This is a radical criticsim of Kant's theory. Indeed, Constant is essentially saying that to act out of pure respect for duty considered as <i>a priori, absolute and universal is to willfully risk supporting the actions of a murderer. Avoiding such a situation, then, requires that we reconsider our guidelines for action, and determine the kinds of rules -- plural -- that apply to various situations. Clearly, there is no absolute moral principle for Constant. The passage we just read makes it very plain. Telling the truth is not an absolute duty. It is applicable only when completed by another principle. Constant's moral philosophy thus takes us in the opposite direction from Kant's. There is no ethics comprised of pure, universal, <i>a priori</i>, absolute principles. Rather, rules are developed based on our actual experiences. Whenever we try to apply grand universal principles to concrete situations, we are forced to bring into play other principles and try to piece together a workable approach using what Constant calls "intermediary principles." It is through the use of these intermediary principles that we can apply universal rules to the specific situations we are confronted with in our daily lives. The question, then, is whether there exists a set of intermediary principles that can guide man in determining the rules his will must follow if he is to act morally, effectively and concretely. Such intermediary principles are needed to solve problems of a casuistic nature, that is, problems relating to the application of general or universal moral principles to concrete individual cases. Now, as you can imagine, Kant did not remain silent. In 1797, shortly after the publication of Constant's piece, Kant wrote a rebuttal -- in which he fittingly refers to his critic as "a French philosopher." In this article entitled "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Benevolent Motives," Kant attacks Constant's doctrine of intermediary principles, and questions whether any moral worth can be attached to what he sarcastically calls a "benevolent lie." The claim that I don't owe the truth to everyone, or at least not to those who have no right to it, excludes the very possibility of a universal foundation of morality. Kant totally rejects this relativistic and <i>a posteriori</i> approach to ethics. Let's quote Kant's article, in which he clarifies his doctrine of virtue, directly: "The 'French philosopher' confuses the action by which someone does harm to another by telling the truth when its avowal cannot be avoided with the action whereby someone does wrong to another. It was merely an accident that the truth of the statement did harm to the occupant of the house, but it was not a free act." So to tell the truth out of duty, regardless of consequences -- whether foreseen or accidental -- is not fundamentally immoral. The intention of being truthful is problematic, morally speaking, only if it betrays a prior intent to harm -- an intent to which it would then be subordinated. In this particular case, says Kant, telling the truth is not the intentional root of my behavior but, on the contrary, a means of harming another, of manifesting my pathological tendencies toward hatred and cruelty. Yet Kant's answer remains problematic in many respects. In fact, it would lead to a long-running intellectual argument on the status of moral action, one that in many ways has framed the debate in moral philosophy all the way through the 20th century and into the present. Can the morality of an action be judged stricly on the basis of its intentions? Or does the moral status of an action not require that we take into account its actual outcome?