[MUSIC] >> The world we live in is more interconnected than it has been at any other time in human history. Everyday, we are in touch with many possibly dozens of countries by way of the products we buy, the services we use, the stories we read, the people we follow online or the food we consume. Our personal and professional lives take place in complex and constantly evolving networks that transmit goods, services, people and information. Most of the time, we aren't even aware of this, because networks are a little bit like air. They are vital, but we only notice them when they fail. At the same time, the international system has never been as institutionalized as it is today. More than 6,700 international organizations look after more than 2,000 multilateral treaties. 1,800 bilateral investment treaties. 250 regional trade agreements and the list could go on, and on. And still, from cybercrime to climate change, the list of unresolved global problems is very long. It is a paradox of our times that just as global cooperation is most needed, it seems to be least effective. So, why is that? One way of explaining this paradox is to understand the tensions between the two most fundamental organizing principals of society. Networks and hierarchies. Networks are flexible. Hierarchies are stable. Networks are resilient. Hierarchies are efficient. One cannot say, one is good and one is bad. Both are vital to the functioning of social systems. They serve different and often complementary functions. Yet unfortunately, they don't always get along. Hierarchies and networks don't exist in separation, they cut across and nurture each other. Most organizations from families to businesses or states have hierarchies. Still, social activity often follows other patterns and this in fact is a very good thing. Just imagine, you could not communicate directly to your colleague. You would need to send a message to your boss who forwards it to his boss, who passes it on to your colleague's boss, who eventually passes it on down to your college. Wouldn't that be terrible and frustrating? The dynamism and adaptability of networks is the main reason why organizations not only tolerate, but nurture and support them. Of course, networks don't all look the same. All of us know people who are a little bit better connected than others. Often, these people end up with more better and fast information than those others somehow. Interestingly, people who are at the center of the network are not always the ones on top of the hierarchy. This is why hierarchies also fear networks. They potentially challenge or undermine their autonomy. So, what does all of this mean for international cooperation? An interconnected world increases the need for rules and standards to guide, and restrain collective activities. Yes, but without a central authority, some sort of a government enforcing rules can be pretty difficult. They either would need to be self-enforcing or there would need to be some kind of powerful actor, a hegemon that is willing and able to provide the necessary guidance. After the Second World War, the world found itself with two competing hedgements. The Soviet Union and the United States. Both provided order within their realm of influence. And unfortunately, after disorder, their realms of influence clashed. However, before relationships turned vicious, the victors of the war also agreed to create a new platform to address global problems together, the United Nations. Despite the paralyzing effect of great power rivalry that set in pretty early, the UN and its specialized agencies along with sector specific agreements in arenas including trade, finance, environment security, successfully enabled corporation on an international scale. They did that by reducing the costs of reaching agreements through established rules and practices and by providing information, particularly about the extent to which governments were following those rules. >> Most international regimes, created in the second half of the 20th century followed what Kiohan calls, the club model of international governance. Cabinet ministers or the equivalent working in the same issue area, often from a relatively small number of rich countries get together to make rules. Trade ministers dominated the GATT and later the WTO. Finance ministers render IMF. Defense and Foreign Ministers met at NATO. Central Banks at the Bank for International Settlements. Typically, they negotiate in secret and then reported their agreements to National Legislatures and publics. For much of the 20th century, the club model of international regimes was very convenient for officials negotiating agreements. In two ways, it kept potential trouble makers out. First, it excluded officials in other government bureaucracies. Environment, labor or finance officials did not participate on a regular basis in WTO negotiations. Second, it excluded the general public. Society was typically confronted with done deals, making domestic politics much easier to manage. The club model worked, because it made international cooperation more efficient and reduced complexity. The Non-Proliferation Treaty helped prevent the spread nuclear weapons. The GATT presided from 1947 to 1993 over several trade rounds that lowered tariffs by up to 90% and the Montreal Protocol, significantly reduced the emissions of ozone-depleting substances. But today, the legitimacy and effectiveness of this club model is challenged by complex networks of actors and problems, which cut across the once effective Hierarchical structures of international regimes. Three particular dynamics come into play here. First, the emergence and reconfiguration of non-state actor networks. Today, there are some 82,000 multinational corporations. 47 of the top 100 economic entities are companies. And together, they are responsible for 80% of industrial output. 30% of merchandise trade and some 10% of global GDP. On top of that, more than 35,000 international NGOs have become part of the global landscape. Sometimes they influence, sometimes they assume the roles and even responsibilities of states. And transnational networks of crime and terrorism also cut across national borders and undermine, and destabilize societies. Second, the reconfiguration of established state networks. While the clubs of the previous era were dominated by few players from a largely cohesive group of industrialized countries, today's networks of states have become much more diverse and distributed. New players have come to the table of international politics and some are suspicious or resentful about the club rules made by the established players. Partly, this resulted in the expansion and change of existing networks such as a transition from G8 to G20. But partly, this also resulted in the creation of entirely new entities such as the BRICS Development Bank. And then third, the empowerment of individuals and the ease of creating new transnational networks. Technology dramatically increased the access to information and ability of citizens to organize, and make themselves heard. In some ways, power has shifted from organizations to networked individuals. The Arab Spring or the spectacular leagues of classified information in the United States illustrate this shift even though some would argue that it might just be a matter of time before states again subordinate these networks to their priorities. All three trends put the clump model of governance to the probe. Three problems stand out in particular. First, siloed international organizations find it hard to manage networked problems. Growing pressure for coordination among agencies and overlapping mandates, take a toll on efficiency and effectiveness. Highly specialized bureaucracies that were set up with a specific mandate find it hard to collaborate in cross-functional formations that are needed to address today's problems. Second, more and more issues defy the simple distinction between domestic and foreign. States face issues, such as drug trafficking, AIDS, terrorism, nuclear waste management or climate change, which cannot meaningfully be categorized in these simple terms. Relying on domestic politics and domestic political processes is bound to fail. Yet, putting too much weight on international organizations without political leadership and public accountability is equally disastrous in many of those cases. And then third, rule making and interpretation in global governance have pluralized. In addition to states and international organizations, private firms, NGOs, subunits of governments and transnational networks play a role too. International organizations are still struggling to embed those kinds of actors. And as a result, less formal governmental and multisector networks have emerged that sometimes include, but often bypass establish international organizations. >> All these tensions play out in the day to day management of international affairs. In the next three sections, you want to share light on them by looking at three specific policy areas that all represent network problems. Trade, climate change and Internet governance. [MUSIC]
